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Selected articles from Arkangel No.4
Winter 1990
Contents:
Sentientism
by Richard D. Ryder
(Author of "Victims of Science" and "Animal Revolution:
Changing Attitudes to Speciesism")
I am against violence done to humans on the same grounds
that I am against violence done to nonhumans; it causes
suffering. Causing suffering to humans in order to prevent
suffering to nonhumans is as wrong as causing suffering to
nonhumans allegedly to prevent suffering to humans. Both are
speciesist.
If people feel impelled by conscience to break the law
gently, that is one thing, but violence against persons
(lawful or unlawful) is quite another. If the conscientious
break the law, they know they will have to face the
consequences. But violence always risks causing suffering. And
pain is evil.
Most animal rightists are very interested in ethics. Unlike
some of our critics we have a heightened sense of right and
wrong. We do not, however, accept the old unthinking moral
values of the past - for example, that it is good to
experiment on animals, hunt them, farm them, eat them and so
on. We question the basis of ethics and pose to ourselves the
two perennial puzzles of morality: should we be moral and what
moral code should we follow?
The first question is really a matter for psychology. What
is moral capacity and why do we have it? All human societies
have rules of conduct covering such things as property, human
life, family organisation and truth telling. However great the
diversity of such rules (one culture, for example, may
condone, polygamy and another condemn it) the fact remains
that rules of some sort always exist; morality seems rooted in
human nature. I suspect that this is because the considerable
brain development of our species makes our behaviour highly
flexible. Unlike an insect whose range of behaviours is
probably very limited, our own range of possible actions
appears to us to be almost unbounded . If someone insults me
while driving I can either ignore the insult, retaliate by
flashing my lights, make a rude gesture, shout back one or
more of a hundred different terms of abuse known to me in a
myriad possible alternative combinations, report the incident
to the police, write a letter about it to The Times or smile
indulgently, and so on. How does one select from such a
repertoire? The answer is morality. A strict upbringing and
the moral conditioning that went with it might prohibit a
large proportion of the possible reactions and in so doing
reduce the anxiety and personal disorder associated with
conflicts of choice.
Severe legal, and indeed, possibly lethal complications are
also avoided socially. I am not saying that the human species
is the only species with a moral code. It is surely true that
the parents of many species teach their young that certain
behaviours (biting mummy's ear or paw, for example) are wrong.
Different societies of the same nonhuman species can have
different cultures just as ours do. But human moral codes are
probably far more complex and diverse than most not only
because of our large brain (no larger, proportionately than
that of the whales) but also because of the complexity of our
language.
What I am saying, then is, that the capacity for morality
helps us to make decisions. We do not have to think so much in
a crisis. This can accelerate reaction times and generally it
reduces anxiety. Almost certainly it also helps create a
cohesive society in which individuals tend to react in the
same way to events. Maybe there is some survival value in
morality.
The second question is "How do we choose a morality?" Are
there objective criteria for right and wrong or is morality
just a matter of taste? Well, personally, I cannot accept that
right and wrong are out there waiting to be discovered like
archeological remains. But I can try to base my conduct on
some sort of rational programme like, for example, being
consistent or following rules that are, as R.M.Hare says,
universalizable, eg. that if somebody holds that it is wrong
to inflict suffering solely for financial gain then this rule
should be applied consistently, not just to relatives and
friends, but also to foreigners and those of other races and
species. Secondly, I can listen to the inner voice of
conscience not the sense of guilt which has been conditioned
into me since childhood "Don't do this, don't do that, you
naughty little boy". No, I am referring to the genuine voice
of conscience which is based upon empathy - the ability we all
have to perceive that others are suffering. This capacity is,
I suspect, innate and can be found in all children from
infancy. They know that the other animals can suffer rather as
humans do. They are right. In the past adults tried to
brainwash the children, just as they themselves were
brainwashed by their own parents into believing that the other
animals were entirely different. This allowed children to grow
up as speciesists without constantly feeling the discomfort of
guilt about their exploitation of other species.
So what I am saying here is that as I know that pain is bad
from my own point of view I believe it is bad for other
sentients too. I make that essential altruistic jump. How far
I jump has in the past been conditioned by my familiarity with
others, my fear of them and my own needs for security,
territory and food. Gradually, the moral circle has widened
from family and tribe to include strangers and then those of
other races. Now we must include those of other species.
Morality is all about altruism.
One of the great problems in ethics, in my opinion, has
been due to the confusion of two quite different things:
theories of behaviour and moral codes. Of course all sentient
creatures seek contentment and try to avoid pain - that is a
fundamental law of all theories of behaviour. But morality is
not about what we tend to do naturally, it is about doing what
we think is right. Morality may go against our natural
impulses very considerably and may be opposed to our own
personal interests. Sometimes our sympathy for others will
make it easy for us to act morally but sometimes this
sympathetic motive will be weaker than other drives motivating
us in the opposite direction; it is in these latter
circumstances that my rational cognitive sense of right and
wrong must strive to overcome temptation. Basically, morality
is about how I treat other sentient beings. It is about
whether we cause pain or pleasure; about whether I do to
others what I believe pleases them. As Confucius said - "What
you do not want done to yourself, do not do to others".
How then do we define "others"? Surely we must define
others to include all sentient beings human, nonhuman and even
the machines of the future if we have grounds for suspecting
that they are conscious. This is what I mean by sentientism.
It does not allow the trading off of the pains and pleasures
of one group against those of another. The weakness of the
utilitarian trade-off model is that it allows, for example,
the intense pleasures of a sadist to outweigh and justify the
agonies he inflicts upon his victims. Surely consciousness or
sentiency is limited to the individual; it is not transferable
to others. You thus cannot aggregate across individuals. Each
individual sentient therefore is sacrosanct; this is
sentientism. And I believe it is the greatest moral challenge
of the millenium.
Is Violence In The Pursuit Of Animals' Rights Morally
Justifiable?
by Robin Webb
(a member of the RSPCA's National Council and former
Assistant Director of Animal Aid)
"VIOLENCE": 1) The exercise or an instance of physical
force... 2) Powerful, untamed or devastating force... 3) Great
strength of feeling... (Collins English Dictionary, 2nd
edition, 1986)
Much has been written by individuals, local groups and
national societies, particularly during the past year or so,
about violence in and by the animals rights movement. Although
open discussion is healthy, as in the series of public debates
between myself and John Curtin, some of the attacks on direct
action have caused deep divisions. This can only detract from
any progress we may have made for our fellow creatures had we
not channelled precious energy into arguing with each other.
Let us then pause, stand back, and take a calm look at what we
mean when we argue the validity or otherwise of using violence
and what we actually define it to be.
The use of what some in our movement term 'violence' is
usually outside the (political) law. The RSPCA clearly cannot
condone the use of unlawful acts in pursuance of its aims
while its front line of defence for non-human animals is the
inspectorate, working with and within the law. To support
breaking the law would destroy the credibility of this vital
force - how could inspectors try to enforce the law, however
inadequate the law may be, if the Society that employs them
excuses actions contrary to such principles? However, although
the RSPCA itself works strictly within the law it confines
criticism of those who choose differently to condemnation of
"actions of animal rights groups that endanger life". When the
policy was adopted it was made clear that the actions referred
to were premeditated ones. This offers clear guidance and
highlights how vague the stated policies of some other
national societies seem.
One example of attempted clarification causing yet more
confusion through lack of proper thought was the article
'Policy on Violence' in issue 5 of 'Animal Aid Campaign News'.
Paragraph I of the piece made it clear that violence should,
from Animal Aid's point of view, be taken to mean "the threat
or actual infliction of physical injury to a sentient being".
An admirable and acceptable definition. However, paragraph 2
then condemns the Animal Liberation Front for "actions which
are violent, OR (my emphasis) which threaten or endanger life"
We are therefore back to a situation where, in Animal Aid's
view, a violent act may be something other than that which
endangers life.
So, where should our movement stand? We usually make quite
clear when arguing the rights of non-human animals that there
is a moral law which transcends the political law. Space
prevents me offering evidence to support such a philosophy so
may I ask you to accept it based on Professor Tom Regan's 'The
Case for Animal Rights' and similar works.
If we therefore believe that human and non-human animals
share a claim to individual rights and that the higher moral
law should prevail then we must also believe that violence is
violence whether it is performed within or without the
political law. For example, capital punishment would not be
condoned even within a legal framework.
Before going further let us address the argument on whether
or not damage to property may be classed as violence. It has
been put to me that one cannot be violent to property as
property does not have feelings. Here I am assuming that the
reader accepts that one sentient creature cannot 'own' another
sentient creature and therefore no sentient creature can be
classed as 'property'. It has also been claimed that, for
example, breaking down a door constitutes violence as someone
may be standing behind or near the door and thereby suffer
injury. Both points of view appear to have certain merits.
In the former example we should consider that whatever good
an inanimate object - battery cage, leghold trap, stereotaxic
device - is doing the human user it will be having an adverse
effect on the non-human used in conjunction with the inanimate
object. If the property (inanimate object) is used to inflict
or support the infliction of distress, suffering or death then
we have a clear moral duty to free the sentient creature from
such inflictions so long as other sentient life is not harmed.
Similar moral concern cannot be extended to inanimate objects;
therefore the destruction of such objects is morally
justifiable.
The latter argument against, for example, breaking down a
door does not appear to have similar moral justification. Let
us consider that, unless already injured, a human could move
away from the door and a non-human animal would be disturbed
by the preceding noise and also move away. Thus it is unlikely
that harm to a sentient being would result from such damage.
Further, if one refrains from such acts the result could be
additional or continuing suffering. If, as discussed earlier,
there is no moral difference between lawful and unlawful
violence then even a joint RSPCA/police raid on an illegal
dogfight which necessitated breaking down a door would be open
to condemnation. Surely this cannot be right?
In my opinion, arson does not fall under the classification
of 'damage to property' but rather, actions that endanger
life. The ALF is proud of its claim never to have harmed human
life but arson has, almost undisputedly, taken life, whether
it be mouse, rat or spider. One cannot check every nook and
cranny of a department store or broiler shed; the presence of
a small creature is not so obvious as that of a human and they
do not understand fire alarms and emergency exits. If one does
not or cannot take at least as great a care to ensure that
spiders are not present as one does to ensure the absence of
humans then that is not only endangering life but also
practical speciesism.
So is damage to property violent? If so, is all damage to
property violent? If only some damage to property is violent
then where should a the line be drawn? The latter two
questions should be clearly answered by those who condemn
damage to property as violence.
My feeling is that damage to property does not constitute
violence as our movement understands it. Whether premeditated
damage to property can be justified as a tactic to achieve
animal liberation is, however, a separate argument for another
time.
Violence against the individual is a much clearer
situation. If we are in the movement because we subscribe to
the Schweitzerian ethic 'Reverence for Life' then violence
against human and non-human animals must be equally abhorrent
to us. If we consider it morally wrong to harm a non-human
animal to benefit a human then it must be also unacceptable to
harm a human animal to benefit a non-human. Therefore,
premeditated violence against any sentient creature must be
inadmissable. To me this is quite straightforward and does not
require further clarification.
So, premeditated violence against individual is wrong but
what about violence and self-defence? Three illustrative
situations would be
a person using a hedgehog as a football and doesn't stop
when requested to do so...
a walk in the woods reveals a badger digger about to kill a
badger by using a spade as an axe...
a group of youths stoning a swan turn on you when you try
to intervene...
Here we are talking about the harshness of the real world,
not some cosy armchair philosophy. Is anyone seriously going
to condemn you for using 'physical force' or 'great strength
of feeling' to prevent what is happening? If so, does such
condemnation equate to tacit support for the act you were
trying to prevent? It is certainly unfortunate that Animal Aid
consciously removed the word 'premeditated' from its
resolution denouncing the use of violence. At what point on
the scales of moral justice does pacifism become violence by
consent?
In conclusion I believe that
* damage to property does not constitute 'violence' as
understood by the animal rights movement...
* premeditated violence against a sentient individual or
group of sentient individuals is contrary to the moral
arguments which are the foundation of the animals rights
movement...
* both spontaneous violence and self-defence, wheresoever
they occur during the pursuit and protection of animals
rights, are at least understandable and in most cases fully
justifiable.
Even if you don't agree with me let us keep the debate
open, friendly and constructive. Never forget that the real
enemy is animal abuse in its many forms and guises - beware
also the 'enemy within' that tries to divert our energies from
the real fight. Never forget the immeasurable vlolence that
our own kind inflicts daily on those creatures with whom we
share this world. Never forget Genesis ch 6 v 6 "And it
repented the Lord that he had made man on the earth, and it
grieved him at his heart. . ."
A Sense Of Perspective
by Seamus Burke
The ALF has not got a policy of infanticide, but for the
industries of animal abuse it is a daily ritual. After
listening and reading various people's reactions to the events
in which explosive devices were placed under the cars of two
vivisectors, it seems that all sense of proportion has been
lost. Violence is an emotive term defined differently by
differept people at different times. It is hard to think
clearly about it when some people in the Animal Rights
Movement are only too willing to raise their hands in horror
and can't get their statements of condemnation out fast
enough.
Unless we want to fall into the trap of speciesism, then
how can the fact that a child was injured accidentally get us
so much more worked up about things than the many millions of
animals that are not only injured brutally and deliberately,
but murdered all the time?
The struggle for Animal Rights should come before any
personal likes or dislikes amongst ourselves, so 1 don't want
to waste time slagging off anyone, but I do think that Mark
Gold's article "Animal Rights and Violence" which appeared in
the August/September issue of "Outrage" ought not to go
unchallenged. "Terrorist" is not a word that should be used
lightly. However, it certainly seems to cloud one's vision
when some Animal Rights activists are dismissed as
"terrrorists" and yet the real terrorists, the ones truly with
blood on their hands (the vivisectors, the factory farmers
etc.) are spared any such terms of abuse. Ranting about the
ALF seems to me to be a tragic waste of time and energy when
we could be doing something really useful like shouting from
the rooftops about animal abuse in all its guises. We get
involved in the Animal Rights movement because we care about
animals, not because of a desire to have anyone person's
political philosophy rammed down our throats. Aren't we
selling the animals short by doing this? Of course we need to
discuss tactics in a rational and open manner (as in Arkangel)
but these arguments ought to be voiced amongst ourselves and
no one should run to the media in hysterics bandying insults
left, right and centre. Nor should anyone feel that they have
the mandate to take on the role of censor for us. Why was the
sale of "Arkangel" stopped at the "Living Without Cruelty"
exhibition because of "adverse publicity"? I suggest to anyone
who feels confused about the nature of violence that they
spend some time in an abattoir or a vivisector's
laboratory.
Of course it was a pity that a child was injured. I don't
think anybody would want to deny that. The child was innocent,
but so too are all the animals that are suffering as a matter
of course. Is the veal calf or the piglet that has its teeth
smashed on being born somehow less innocent than the child?
Are the male chicks that are crushed to a pulp "guilty" by
virtue of being the wrong sex for the egg industry, or the
hens that are debeaked routinely? Why do some people get more
incensed about a minor injury to a child than about the
massacre of animals that is taken for granted every day?
Also, the argument about the "sanctity of human life" needs
to be looked at more closely. It seems to me that it is used
in a very opportunistic manner, only when it suits the purpose
of the person pontificating about it. Obviously, not all human
life is sacred at all times, Mrs Thatcher was only too keen to
send men off to be killed in the Falklands War, or in Northern
Ireland. It is a stock phrase that the mouthpieces of the
State churn out whenever it fits their purpose. "Non violence"
is also a joke when we think about the activities of the
police etc.
It is interesting that a lot of people sympathise with the
African National Congress, even within nice middle class
circles. Yet we all know that the ANC is involved in violent
direct action, but somehow we see apartheid as being so wrong
that we can go along with the actions of the ANC (as I agree
we should). And innocent people do get hurt, which is always
unfortunate. But you don't see the leaders of the
anti-apartheid movement falling over themselves to condemn the
people who have carried out the actions, nor to distance
themselves from them. And we know too that the ALF has, to
quote from a recent ALF SG newsletter, "a strict policy which
all members adhere to when carrying out ALF actions. This
policy is to take all possible precautions not to harm any
human or animal life." Now perhaps with the car bombs
(incidentally not claimed by the ALF) not enough precautions
were taken, but we must balance the unintentional harm to the
child as a result of this action with the trouble caused to
the vivisection Industry (eg. increased security meaning less
profit). Isn't it illogical that we can support the
liberation/freedom movements of the people of Africa and Latin
America, where violence is an everyday, occurrence, and yet
find it so completely unacceptable within the Animal Rights
movement? Is this not speciesism?
Surely what we have got to do is to make the lives of the
animal abusers as difficult and as unprofitable as we possibly
can. The animals cannot afford for us to get tied up arguing
amongst ourselves about linguistics, nor should we be afraid
of dirtying our hands rather than sitting at home feeling smug
because we are living a "cruelty-free lifestyle". "Public
education" has of course got a part to play but on its own it
is not enough. Without the ALF I wonder how many people would
know what a battery egg is. I think that we ought to be
offering our complete support to those brave enough to risk
their freedom on behalf of animals rather than labelling them
"terrorists" and saying that they can "play no part in what we
are striving to achieve". I am of course not advocating
murdering anybody, but we do need to be able to put things
into perspective rather than let ourselves be manipulated by
the media into knee jerk reactions. When people in the Animal
Rights movement are approached by the media after events such
as the car bombs, they have a choice as to what to say. All
people that want to prevent animal abuse should expect them to
make the choice that helps animals. But the Mark Golds of this
world choose to slag off the ALF, the only effect of which is
to worsen the image of Animal Rights activists in the eyes of
the public. They could have chosen to say that the suffering
of the child was infinitesimal compared to the suffering of
laboratory and farm animals, while at the same time, if they
wished, making clear their own personal preferences as to
tactics. They did not make that choice.
Perhaps we ought to remind ourselves each day what is
happening at this very moment to the animals imprisoned and
tortured for profit. Please can we have unity between us
instead of all this infighting and abuse? Please can we clear
our vision so that we don't get diverted from the proper focus
of our energies let's remember that the important thing is to
work for animal liberation, by whatever means necessary, and
that this should override everything else. Let's remember who
our real enemies are - the enemies of animals - and let's get
the bastards! (Whoops, I forgot to say - in their
pockets).
The Real World
by Barry Horne
There have been several articles in the last 4 issues of
Arkangel condemning incendiary device actions and the car bomb
in Bristol. Quite frankly I wonder just who the authors of
these articles really are. Do they live in the real world or
just in their own private fantasy world where everybody plays
by the queensbury rules? Animal abuse is carried out by sick
perverted people who care nothing about right or wrong but
only about profit and perverse pleasure. This is the real
world. These sort of people wont be discouraged by peaceful
campaigning but only by hitting them where it hurts most, ie.
financially. Incendiary devices are designed to inflict this
financial loss by destroying their property, be it department
stores or livestock trucks. This is the only language they
understand.
As for the car bomb, well the thinking behind that is plain
for anybody with an open mind to see. The articles by people
in the last issue on this subject amazed and disgusted me. Val
Graham states that "a vegan AR supporter out walking a dog"
could have been hurt. This statement is so ludicrous as to
defy description. There is a war going on out there Val and in
any war innocent civilians unfortunately get hurt, but of
course the bomb was not intended for that purpose but was
aimed at a vivisector. The only bad thing about it was that
the vivisector walked away unharmed and free to continue
torturing and killing animals. Is this what you want Val? Why
not hand him a leaflet and ask him to change his ways? He'll
laugh in your face as you well know.
Val then goes on to say "can we now expect those
responsible to go the whole hog and start strapping explosives
to dogs?" This statement is so ridiculous and confusing that I
can only assume she was getting hysterical by this time. I
wonder who you really are Val. Comments in your article about
putting the movement back years, harm done to the movement
etc, are classic Animal Aid, BUAV etc. type statements and
have no place in a genuine animal rights magazine.
The comments by Ronnie Lee about the car bomb being both
"tactically and morally wrong" also need challenging. The
tactics of any action can only be gauged by the long term
effect it has on the struggle. In this case the vivisector
involved now has some inkling of the terror he causes every
day to innocent animals and this action must therefore be
viewed favourably. As for it being morally wrong, I would ask
Ronnie if it is morally right NOT to try and prevent
vivisection. The object of this car bomb was surely to prevent
this particular vivisector from continuing his evil work. It
was surely therefore morally right.
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