by Ted Altar
[ARRS Administrator Note: One of the
most common defenses put up by anti-AR persons is to assert that the moral
arguments advanced by AR adherents have no force because they are simply a
matter of opinion. "My ethics are as good as yours; how dare you try to
impose yours on me?" is an oft-heard refrain. The thesis espoused by these
persons is that of ethical subjectivism. Here, Ted Altar soundly refutes the
thesis.]
Document sections:
The Core Idea of Ethical
Subjectivism
10 Prima Facie Objections to Ethical Subjectivism
The
Common-Sense Core Behind Ethical Subjectivism
The Doctrine of
Subjectivism Begs the Question
References
The Core Idea
of Ethical Subjectivism
Ethical subjectivism serves as a
kind of meta-ethical critique that works as follows: whenever anyone makes
some ethical claims or judgements, such claims and judgements are demoted as
being in reality only expressions of the personal attitudes of the person
making those statements. Ethical judgements are said to be simply judgements
about the way we feel or think about things, and if we didn't think or feel
these ways there would be no ethical issues whatsoever.
If someone,
for instance, asserts that the hunting of animals is wrong, then such a
person is merely saying, "I disapprove of such acts". Such self-reports of
personal attitudes or autobiography cannot in themselves, of course, serve
as evidence or as justification for the truth value of an ethical claim. The
implication here is that there is never any truth value to an ethical claim,
hence the mere disapproval on my part doesn't make it wrong for someone else
or make it wrong at all. So what is a person who passionately disapproves of
some human act going to do? All that we can do, presumably, to ensure that
those acts which we find personally abhorrent and would like to see stopped
is to seek sufficient support from others of a similar subjective outlook
and join together to legislate some kind of social contract. Maybe there are
enough fellow humans out there who also disapprove of human torture that
together we can agree among ourselves to condemn and disallow this act. If
we are an empowered majority or a governing minority, then we can impose our
will upon others. This brings us to a kind of "contractarianism", which is
quite deficient and unattractive (refer to the AR FAQ Question #24).
10 Prima Facie Objections to Ethical Subjectivism
Now, before I give a more sympathetic reading of subjectivism, permit me
to list some commonly observed problems with ethical subjectivism.
1. Nobody Can Ever Be Wrong Or Right
If today I
believe in animal rights and tomorrow I do not, it cannot be said whether I
was right or wrong on either occasion. If ethical judgements are simply a
matter of personal feelings, opinions and beliefs, then if those feelings,
beliefs or opinions change then I am neither more right nor more wrongheaded
as a result. I've merely changed, and there is no incompatibility of my
future ethics with my current one. Hence, as G. E. Moore noted
[1], the subjectivist cannot say that something is right or wrong;
indeed, he or she is compelled to accept that what was deeply felt or
believed to be wrong can at a different time, or at the same time, be also
right. This would throw the sine qua non of rationality, namely logical
consistency, out the window.
2. Non-Incompatibility Between
All Ethical Beliefs
From 1 above, it would follow that
nobody's views are incompatible with one another. If the sole ground of
ethical judgements resides only in the personal feelings or beliefs of
people, then when I say that "killing children is wrong" it cannot be said
to be incompatible with someone else who says that "killing children is
right". Both believe themselves right and if that is all there is to it,
then both are right since ethics is now a mere matter of personal feelings
or beliefs and not a matter of someone being more correct or justified than
another.
3. No Independent Role for Ethical Judgement
If, however, it is the case that an ethical judgement underlies or
justifies my moral feelings and moral beliefs, then such judgements cannot
be identical with those feelings and beliefs of moral approval or
disapproval. The subjectivist abandons this distinction and therefore must
give up on there being any separate capacity, role, or legitimacy for
ethical judgement.
4. Non-Sequitur from Facts of Diversity
Now, the mere fact that individuals fundamentally will differ in their
attitudes towards things, cannot by itself entail that there is no ethical
appraisals whatsoever which are more justified than others. Nor can we
conclude from this fact of diversity that all ethical reasonings or methods
are of equal justification.
5. There Are Some Cultural
Universals
That individuals, or even cultures, differ does
not entail that there is no general agreement, or the possibility of such
agreement. Many cultural anthropologists recognize that in spite of the
immense cultural diversity that exists, there nevertheless is a remarkable
uniformity of disapproval (not perfect but very considerable), towards such
things as simple as promise-breaking to more serious acts of cruelty and
homicide. A structural reason for such universal disapprovals is that it
would be very difficult, if not impossible, for any society to survive
without that society embracing certain values. Social cohesion needs values
and some values simply work better than others.
6. Rational
Consensus is in Principle Possible
Just because individuals
differ in their current outlook does not entail that given a minimal degree
of open-mindedness and rational dialogue, much of their disagreement might
not disappear. The disagreement might simply be about the implications of an
underlying common principle due to a different evaluation of the facts. Such
factual disagreements have the potential of being resolved empirically. Even
a disagreement over principles might be resolved by a open consideration of
their full entailments and possible conflicts with other principles more
commonly shared.
7. A Reductio Ad Absurdum
If subjectivism is true, then all I have to do to settle any doubt
whatsoever regarding someone else's actions is simply to introspect to see
what might be my own feelings, attitudes, or beliefs on the issue. Given
that such introspection usually yields an unmistaken knowledge about what I
feel and believe, then how is that I can ever be mistaken in the real world
about whether an action is right or not? Imagine a courtroom jury deciding
its verdict by a mere polling of each member's subjective opinions, without
any debate or dialogue. The point of such debate is predicated on the notion
that we can be wrong in our ethical judgements and that mere feelings or
subjective opinions (of which we are not wrong) are insufficient. Keep in
mind that while I cannot be wrong about what I believe, what I believe can
be very wrong indeed. Ethical subjectivism would deny this distinction. The
notion of being wrong no longer applies except in the following minimal
sense: if someone is "wrong", they can only be wrong with respect to what
they themselves really feel or believe. Ethics is thus reduced to
psychotherapy.
8. The Irrelevancy of Justified Belief for a
Subjectivist
If I can't be wrong in my beliefs, then
whatever factual mistakes I might have made in arriving at those beliefs is
irrelevant. Hence, if I believe hunting is right because it helps the deer
population, then even if this fact were later to be decisively proven to be
wrong, I am still right! After all, the subjectivist would have us believe
that ethical judgements are simply a matter of prior beliefs or feelings of
approval or disapproval towards things. When I said that I thought hunting
was right because it helped the deer maintain their population, all I was
doing was merely stating my personal pro-hunting opinion or feeling and
nothing really compels me to change even when the facts that I might have
invoked for that belief change. Again, ethical subjectivism claims that all
ethical judgements are NOT judgements based upon good reasons or facts but
are merely a matter of personal taste or opinion. Hence, to attempt to
justify those personal tastes or opinions by any appeals to facts or reasons
is simply superfluous and irrelevant.
9. The Trivial
Circularity of Subjectivism
Thus, we have a circularity
about what is right and wrong: "hunting is right because I think it is
right". But why is it right? "Because I think it is right". And why do you
think it is right? "Because I think it is right", and so the circle never
ends.
10. Subjectivism is Not a Coherent Theory
The above points lead to the conclusion that subjectivism cannot be an
ethical standard or benchmark. Our common-sense view is that the general
purpose of ethical discourse to arrive at some self-evident, justified, or
defensible principles, principles that can serve to adjudicate what might be
the conflicting interests and competing claims of other individuals and
groups. But if each individual, according to the subjectivist, is in fact
his or her own standard, then in point of fact we have no standard by which
to adjudicate these conflicts
[2]. The whole point of ethical discourse has been frustrated.
Subjectivism, since it cannot be a standard of ethical appraisal, therefore
cannot be a rational doctrine of ethics.
The only recourse, if one
still wishes there to be some normative principles for society, would be to
resort to some version of contractarianism. That some such recourse is
necessary is given by the fact that no subjectivist is an equalitarian with
respect to other individuals pursuing all their subjective interests. Such
interests might well conflict with their own. If we are to have more than a
mere personal strategy of living, a private egoist ethics that is undermined
or inexpedient if it is made public, then the subjectivist needs to turn to
something like contractarianism. The alternative, if one is to remain
consistent with his or her subjectivist credo, is to simply give up on
defending or challenging any public policy whatsoever or another person's
views. This does not seem to be the natural inclination of ethical
subjectivists, so what are they to do?
The Common-Sense Core
Behind Ethical Subjectivism
Given the above objections to
ethical subjectivism, it must indeed seem odd that so many people are
attracted to a theory that is really very deficient and unsatisfactory, as
ethical theories go. One reason that G. E. Moore gives for this attraction
is that many people simply find it difficult to understand or conceive what
we can possibly mean by the words "right" and "wrong" except to say that is
how we simply feel or believe things to be. Maybe, as Moore suggested, it is
naturally difficult for many people to understand that ethical discourse can
be objective without being absolute. That is, there is a widespread tendency
to seek complete certitude and full objectivity of things before admitting
of their reality. Such stringent standards are not found in scientific
discourse where we can justify some theories and activities in terms of
facts (but not all), nor do we need to question each and every tread of the
whole enterprise of science before believing in the possibility of science.
Are we not therefore being far too stringent in our demands for absolute
certitude in our practical discourse of ethics?
Now, permit me to
change hats and attempt to be more generous and ask what might be the
authentic attraction behind subjectivism.
As the Canadian
political/ethical philosopher Kai Nelson
[3] points out, after we have been confronted with the myriad of
different views and meta-ethical treatises, the "feeling" emerges that maybe
there are in the end no real or knock-down arguments. Indeed, why should I
choose to act morally rather than immorally? Certainly, one could argue that
self-interest might be better served if I am not bound by morality,
especially on those occasions when I can get away with it. What this kind of
reflection leads us to is that at some basic level I must ultimately decide
to CHOOSE to act morally or not. Maybe the existentialists were right after
all. Hence, we would say, "its a value judgement" and "in the end it is a
matter of what sort of person you want and choose to be". I must in the end
choose, and no intellectual weighting of the pros and cons can ultimately
settle the matter for me. Here we have an important foundation for our
common-sense preference for individual autonomy, and what greater autonomy
can we have but to choose that there be value, because nothing compels value
otherwise.
This much, I think is true about subjectivism, but as
Robert Nozick
[4] has well argued, simply because we must ultimately choose that there
be values does not mean that we also have complete freedom to choose their
nature. "Value", then, is something inert with no causal powers of its own
to compel assent; at best, value can act only through value perceivers who
pursue it. Values exist for value perceivers, and each person must choose
that there be value and then CONSENT to what might be the inherent merits
and rational requirements of what has been chosen.
But why should we
choose values and what guides our better choice? First of all, we can't but
choose value even when we choose that there be no values. Let us say that I
simply opt for always satisfying my personal self-interest even at the
expense of others. Even this value of the psychopath is a value of sorts but
hardly a very interesting or useful morality. Again, we need to affirm some
set of values that can meaningfully guide our interactions with each other
and help resolve our conflicts by some appeal to principles. I would also
add that ethics becomes most interesting when it forwards a vision of a
better world rather than simply an ad hoc justification of the status quo
ante. Most of us believe that things could be better for us all, and that a
system of value commitments that helps to inform us about how things ought
to be for a better world makes ethics more interesting. We all would like to
say that something is the better course because it is the "right act", "the
right thing to do". What better rational can we have for doing what we do?
In this way, as value perceiving and choosing beings, it can be said
that we more distinctively realize our better human possibilities. Now, if
we are willing to choose value and to therefore be willing to reason
ethically, nothing that the subjectivist would say need upset the
objectivity and rationality of our ethical criteria.
Of course, the
hard core subjectivist might here interject and say, "what if I don't choose
to be that way, what if I refuse to commit myself to value and refuse to
accept the better rationality that might follow from a proper analysis of
those values?". Here, as Kai Nelson points out, all that we can say is that
people almost universally are not that way. Yes, there are psychopaths, but
most of us are perceptive to, say, the value of another human and non-human
being, to the value that pain and cruelty are inherently wrong, and we
choose to affirm such values.
Some further considerations will
temper this capitulation into a complete subjectivism. Although subjectivism
will vary among individuals and societies, all societies and individuals are
interested in preserving morality; after all, there are rationally justified
vested interests in preserving and advancing these moralities, both on a
societal and on an individual level. For instance, psychopaths do live
disruptive lives and end up in prison in spite of all their prideful
boasting of being beyond and free of any bonds of morality; they do what
they really feel like doing while the rest of us are so tethered to our
seeking a general ethic. Of course, the ordinary subjectivist is far from
being a psychopath, but if we were to take complete subjectivism seriously
then is not the psychopath the ultimate subjectivist, one who not merely
affirms that all is a matter of how one personally feels or believes, but
also acts upon only his or her personal feelings or beliefs as they occur at
any time?
The Doctrine of Subjectivism Begs the Question
Now, permit me to give one final blow to subjectivism. Saying that moral
issues are merely matters of subjective opinion with no other justification
simply begs the question as why this should be considered a serious retort
to another's ethics at all. If it is not relevant, then it cannot serve as a
some kind of counter-argument to those who would forward a justification for
some ethical stance. If it is relevant as a demolisher of all other ethics
but its own, then indeed it becomes its own ethics and therefore begs some
further justification other than, "it is my subjective opinion that all
ethical views are subjective".
Consider the following. Any would-be
subjectivist either explicitly or implicitly must forward the claim that his
or her "personal subjectivity" is important and desirable. If it wasn't,
then such a claim cannot have any force over, say, the claim of animal
rights. Unless the subjectivist is truly consistent with their subjectivism
and keeps it to themselves as a kind of private strategy of living, then
such a subjectivist cannot be the overt iconoclast of all ethical views but
their own. That is, when a subjectivist comes out of their private,
subjective closet, he or she would have to acknowledge that another person's
subjectivity is of equal moral importance. But why be fair? Every
subjectivist probably believes his or her subjective preferences to be the
best, at least for themselves, and it is preferable if no one else's
subjectivity interferes. But is this simply not another way of asking "why
be ethical"? Why should I promote my subjective preferences even when it
conflicts with what might be the subjective preferences of others? Thus, the
subjectivist cannot evade an ethical claim by merely stating that there is
no justification for taking any ethical point of view at all since he or she
is in fact taking one.
Since in the end we must choose that there be
values, then let us choose well and be guided by the rational entailments of
that choice, and be further willing to subject our choices to a rational
discussion of their merits or demerits. Only in this way can we discover how
well we have chosen and how we might better choose for a better world for
all of us.
References
1. G. E. More (1912). Ethics (chpt 3).
London: Oxford University Press.
2. Kurt Baier (1958). The Moral Point
of View: A Rational Basis of Ethics. (see p. 308) Ithaca: Cornell University
Press.
3. Kai Nielson (1989). Why Be Moral? (chpt. 8) New York:
Prometheus Books.
4. Robert Nozick (1981). Philosophical Explanations. (chpt.
6) (winner of the Ralph Waldo Emerson award of phi beta kappa). Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press.
