ed. note: link to 2013 update on these issues at end of article
Two Movements and Human-Animal Continuity:
This article is about the images, representations, and treatment of
animals in two movements: the animal welfare/rights/liberation movement -
the animal movement for short - and the deep green/deep ecology movement.
More specifically it wants to look at the way in which each of these
movements comes to terms with - or fails to come to terms with - the
natural continuity existing between animals and humans.
No matter how each movement is typified, any definition will contain
some form of generalization. This is inevitable since there are people,
among them ecofeminists (Warren 1994), who would define themselves as
animal advocates as well as deep green.
Members of the animal movement tend to focus on animal individuals as
sentient beings and on our ethics vis-a-vis these beings. The domain for
animal defenders is that nature which has evolved individual and sentient,
that nature which can feel pain, pleasure and fear (Singer
Because many animal advocates (short for: the members of the
animal movement) live in urban areas, are city dwellers (Francione 1996,
Montgomery 2000), the animals they encounter tend to be those we have
incorporated into our work and living places such as production animals in
factory farms, animals used as organic instruments in laboratories, and
companion animals. That is: urban individuals encounter animals that are
either domesticated or been made to live (and die) in human-manufactured
habitats (Sabloff 2001). Having said this, animal advocates do focus on
hunted animals and this concerns wild rather than domesticated animals.
Recreational hunting has a long history, especially in North America
(Cartmill 1993, Flynn 2002).
The animal movement’s focus on sentience stems from the understanding
that there is continuity between the human and animal condition. Human
sentience has ethical significance. It is at the root of the condemnation
of oppression, torture, genocide. Human-animal continuity implies the
acknowledgement that many animals have bodies and nervous systems that
resemble ours. If well-being is important to humans, it cannot but be
important to animals also. Not only do many animals have bodies like ours,
their subjectivity - their mind and their emotional life-bears resemblance
to us. Like us, animals are, in Tom Regan’s terms “ subject-of-a-life”
(Regan 1983). Human-animal continuity in body and mind calls for parallel
continuity in ethics, such that ethical obligations vis-a-vis animals
cannot be radically different from those vis-a-vis humans.
Many people in the animal movement tend to be almost indifferent to all
nature other than animal nature. Supposedly non-sentient living nature,
such as plants and trees, is generally not taken into consideration.
Neither are non-living, inorganic natural entities such as rocks, rivers,
or even ecosystems. In themselves these parts of nature are not sentient
and individually they cannot suffer so the animal movement often overlooks
or dismisses them (Hay 2002).
The animal movement is highly critical of the traditional Cartesian
notion of ‘animal-machine’ and constitutes the most important group
worldwide to condemn factory farming. But it seems to have no objection
against similar things done to plants (Dunayer 2001). A concept such as
‘plant-machine’ and the intensive vegetable and plant farming that is
currently taking place do not raise the same eyebrows. The movement’s
critique of objectification and exploitation seems to rest solely on the
aforementioned notion of sentience. The objectification -including things
like genetic manipulation- of the rest of nature goes largely unnoticed or
By concentrating on sentient beings, animal advocates abstract from the
environmental context of animal existence. Many animal activists have no
conception of how animals, even as individuals, are integrated into other
nature. One sometimes encounters a certain uneasiness among members of
this movement about nature’s meat-eaters - as though the eating of animals
by other animals were something that ideally should not exist. Some animal
rightists and liberationists tell me that, were it possible, they would
like to ‘phase out’ predator-prey relationships or at least liberate
(save) the prey animal from the equation (pers. comm. in several
Another example of refusing to accept animal meat-eating as a
zoological necessity is the tendency among vegetarian/vegan animal
advocates to turn their carnivorous companion animals into vegetarians as
well by feeding them plant-derived food often accompanied by special
dietary supplements. Admittedly in North America standard pet food is
hardly ever fresh and tends to come out of a packet or tin, unlike Europe
where one can get fresh and increasingly organic free-range meat for one’s
companion animals at the local butcher. While many of these people do
acknowledge that their animal’s body may not ‘be built’ for vegetarian or
vegan food, it is apparently no problem for them that the necessary daily
intake of supplements will make that animal totally dependent on the
health industry. Inadvertently these people are turning animals into
duplicates of themselves: modern consumers of the manufactured products of
an industrial age. The animals’ lives are humanized and colonized – their
alienation taken to another extreme. Is this about protecting companion
animals from non-ethical food or about imposing human ethics on the animal
other? Incidentally, much plant-based and processed food happens to be the
end-product of unsustainable monocultures - to which many animal habitats
have had to give way - and has been put on the market by the same
globalized and diversified agro-industrial complex which also produces
standard pet foods (Noske 1997).
Many animal advocates thus seem to have trouble accepting nature as an
interdependent system where everything has its place, function, and
appropriate physical organisation. Organic beings took a long time
evolving in relation to each other and to non-living inorganic nature.
Nature is a community where every living thing lives off everything else
(food, even vegan food, is living nature in a killed state), and in the
zoological realm this means that both plant-eating and meat-eating have
their respective raisons d’�tre. Predation is neither a negligible anomaly
nor an ethical deficiency in the ecosystem (Plumwood 1999).
At the risk of generalizing too much I see a lack of environmental
awareness and environmental critique among many animal advocates.
Urbanization, technological optimism, the modern urbanocentric mind-set
(Lemaire 2002) are often taken for granted. I have met animal rightists,
themselves living in high rise blocks in a North American city, who feel
they should persuade Inuit people in the continent’s north to move down
south. The argument offered is that by abandoning the frozen lands their
ancestors lived on for so many generations these Inuit could take up a
more moral lifestyle vis-�-vis animals and become vegetarians (which at
present they cannot be for the simple reason that where they are living
hardly anything grows.)
I also have come across animal shelters whose managers on principle do
not give companion animals to people with a garden, for fear that by going
outdoors such animals could escape and come to harm. Accidental death in
traffic was seen as infinitely more horrific than a lifelong existence
Many members of the animal movement seem to move surrounded by machines
in an entirely humanized, electronic techno-world and tend to treat this
circumstance simply as a given. The hegemony of the car in modern society,
for example, hardly seems cause for concern to them. However, even apart
from everything else that the car represents, this type of private
transport does result in numerous animal deaths. According to Wildcare, a
wildlife rehabilitation centre in Toronto, most injured and orphaned
animals brought in are victims of auto transport and to a lesser extent
cat attacks (pers. communication with wildlife rehabilitator Csilla
Darvasi, see Braunstein 1998 for the US). While cars are causing direct
death or injury, habitat destruction connected with automobility and road
building cause extensive indirect death and even extinction. Members of
the animal movement often show no awareness of the violence involved in
bulldozing an acre of land or building a road. One doesn’t see much blood
but it causes whole communities of animals and plants to perish
In sum: the animal movement tends to portray animals as though they
were isolated, city-dwelling consumer-citizens, living entirely outside of
any ecological context. Such a view amounts to a form of reductionism:
Animals for people in the deep green/deep ecology movement are first
and foremost wild animals, i.e., fauna living in the wild. It is not
sentience or cruelty issues that are central here: it is nature,
naturalness, and environment (Baird Callicott 1989). Incidentally, the
word environment itself is a very problematic term: it literally means
that which surrounds us. By definition it is not ‘us ourselves’. In the
term environment the separation between ourselves and nature is already
final (Noske 1997).
Deep greens tend to come down hard on anything that is no longer
considered ‘environment’, no longer pristine or positively contributing to
the ecosystem. Feral animals and domesticated animals are not popular in
these circles. Central concepts are nature, species, and biodiversity (Low
2001). Only those animals that are still part of a given ecosystem really
count for this movement. Animals are approached as representatives of
their species. They are almost equated with their species or with the
ecosystem of which they are part. The animal as individual is often
Feral animals seem to be getting the worst of both worlds: they are
neither an interesting species, nor individuals worthy of somebody’s moral
concern (Rolls 1969, Soul'/Lease 1995, Reads 2003). If anything, they are
seen as vermin. It goes without saying that as species they do pose a
threat to the natural ecosystems. Rats, cats, rabbits, dogs, foxes,
horses, donkeys, pigs, goats, water buffaloes - animals intentionally or
unintentionally brought into the Australian or American continent (by
humans) - are threatening local biodiversity. These feral animals can and
do destroy the balance in naturally evolved communities. The predators
among them sometimes totally wipe out indigenous species whose members
have no natural defence against these ‘foreigners’. Herbivorous feral
animals can totally devastate habitats that native animals are dependent
upon (Reads 2003). (Unfortunately such ecological hazards are sometimes
belittled or downplayed by the animal movement.)
people perceive feral animals as members of unwanted species and advocate
their destruction, often by very inhumane means. Until recently the
National Parks and Wildlife Service in Australia was in the habit of
shooting brumbies (feral horses) from the air, thereby indiscriminately
massacring herds and disrupting whole horse societies and families. In the
north of the continent water buffaloes are being run down by 4WDs equipped
with huge ‘roo bars’. Rabbits are purposely being targeted with introduced
deadly diseases, often by means of specially infected fleas which are then
released into their burrows (Reads 2003). Foxes and feral cats and dogs
are being killed by means of poison baits. From the literature on human
poisoning (Bell 2001) and from quite recent cases of food poisoning in
China (newspaper reports September 2002) we know what horrendous suffering
is involved in death by poisoning. It can’t be all that different for
animals. Among deep greens, however, the suffering of feral and farm
animals hardly counts.
Sentience in the deep ecology/deep green discourse is often treated as
some sort of byproduct of animal life. So is individuality. The natural
capacity of sentience is never included in any notion of environment,
ecology or nature.
Some deep greens/deep ecologists such as Aldo Leopold, Gary Snyder,
Paul Shepard, (cf. Leopold 1949, Shepard 1996) endorse modern recreational
hunting as a way to be at one with nature. Not many deep greens are taking
a critical position on hunting except when it involves endangered species.
The issue tends to revolve around numbers rather than the preciousness of
individual lives. Neither do deep greens tend to take a critical stance on
animal experimentation. After all professional ecologists and conservation
biologists often conduct experiments themselves.
Mostly, experimenters are using individuals of numerically strong
species or species especially bred for the purpose such as white mice and
rats. In the eyes of deep greens and deep ecologists these are no longer
‘nature’ and so their well-being is low on their priority list.
Deep greens/deep ecologists have been known to argue that hunting is
part of human nature when it was still in tune with other nature. They
usually point toward hunter/gatherer societies. Hunting is natural, they
say. In deep green circles the hunting of animals is felt to be more
natural than having animals for companions, which is often seen as
degenerate. However the roots of the phenomenon of companion animals go as
far back as hunting. All societies from Paleolithic times onwards have
been known to keep animals as pets or companions. It occurs in all
societies, in all periods of history and in all economic classes (Serpell
1986). It may not exactly be ‘human nature’ but apparently many people
have felt the need for a face-to-face or touch-to-touch relationship with
individuals of another species (L�vi-Strauss 1973, Tuan 1984). So much for
the ‘unnatural-ness’ of companion animals.
Because deep greens do not have much time for domesticated animal
nature they tend to be rather uninformed and unconcerned about what
happens to animals in factory farms and laboratories. During various
ecotours in the Australian outback it strikes me time and again how no
effort whatsoever is made to avoid serving factory-farmed meat to the
participants of such a tour. When queried on the issue, the often
ecologically astute tour guides tend to demonstrate an entirely value-free
and neutral attitude to where the tour food was coming from. Deep
greens/deep ecologists might disapprove of factory farming because of its
unsustainability and its polluting effect on the nature outside, but not
because of the things done to natural beings inside. Production and
companion animals simply do not figure as ‘green’ (Noske 1994).
In sum: the deep green/deep ecology movement tends to equate animals
with their species. Equating animals with their species or with their
ecosystem amounts to another form of reductionism: ecosystemic
Disembodied empathy versus embodied antipathy
Both movements are potentially united in their struggle against
anthropocentrism: the idea of humanity as the measure of all things. But
apart from this there seem to be few platforms where the two groups
actually meet: only during some international campaigns such as the ones
against seal-hunting and whaling. The first time a group like Greenpeace
showed any concern for individual animal welfare was when many years ago
in Canada three whales got stuck in the ice. The International Fund for
Animal Welfare, though essentially an animal welfare organisation, does
from time to time put forward arguments to do with habitat destruction and
extinction of endangered species.
Strangely enough - because one would expect it the other way round - it
is the animal movement rather than the deep ecology movement which invokes
animal-human continuity as a line of reasoning for considering animals as
individuals. On the other hand, many animal advocates are themselves
almost the embodiment of human-animal discontinuity. As mentioned before,
in this movement there hardly exists any critique of the way present-day
technology is alienating humans from their ‘animalness’. This issue is
tackled by the deep green/deep ecology movement rather than by the animal
Again consider the car issue. For all other species, bodily movement is
first and foremost organic movement: it involves muscle power, fatigue, or
sweat. But for modern humans bodily movement is more and more being
replaced by mechanisation and computerizing. They let machines do the
moving for them and as a result they are becoming more and more
unanimal-like. Hardly anybody in animal advocacy circles looks upon this
as something problematic which could stand in the way of the natural human
condition, i.e. our physical animalness. For them this issue appears to
have nothing to do with human-animal continuity. But continuity is not
just about the ‘humanlike-ness’ of animals but also about the
‘animallike-ness’ of humans. There is an existential and crucial
connectedness between the two. In circles of the animal lobby, however,
human-animal continuity remains largely an abstract moral principle which
is hardly ‘lived’ in reality. One could perhaps say that this attitude is
characterised by disembodied empathy: the empathy is real but its material
The deep green/deep ecology movement, by contrast, does appreciate the
wonders of nature, is conscious of animal-human continuity, and denounces
various technologies (including the car) as alienating and harmful to
nature. But there exists a strange contradiction here too.
Though in deep green circles it is acknowledged that modern human
practices have been extremely exploitative of nature and the wild, this
does not seem to have induced much sympathy for exploited animals. Animal
victims, be they domesticated or feral, are blamed for their own
predicament and in some cases for posing an active threat to what is
perceived as real nature.
Although the deep greens, in contrast to their city-based counterparts
in the animal movement, are more likely to opt for a natural lifestyle and
to be more mindful of a shared animal-human past, this doesn’t translate
into sympathy with animals that have fallen by the wayside. This attitude
could be characterised as embodied antipathy. Human-animal continuity is
lived and ‘realised’, but instead of empathy is often accompanied by a
disdain for those beings that no longer lead natural lives in the
appropriate ecosystem. Denatured though such beings may be, they
nevertheless are still close enough to nature to possess the natural
capacity for suffering whether it be pain, boredom, listlessness, social
and ecological deprivation or agonizing death.
Another contradiction is apparent here as well. In regions like North
America and Australia the ecosystemic focus is strong and as mentioned
before is often expressed by advocating harsh measures against the exotic
and the feral (Aslin/Bennett 2000, Reads 2003). One wonders what
self-image underlies such attitudes. Is this a curious case of human
foreigners (in the ecological sense) condemning animal foreigners? Would
such people advocate the eradication of themselves, members of a group of
exotic white invaders whose adverse impact on the local ecosystem has been
well-documented? Would they be in favour of curbing all - non-aboriginal -
human lives and births, not to mention more drastic measures? If the
answer is negative, how can such measures be justified with regard to
animals? Downplaying animal sentience and animal cruelty issues while at
the same time upholding human sentience arguments endorses ethical
discontinuity between humans and animals, albeit perhaps
The recent developments in animal biotechnology are going to be a test
case for both movements. Some animal welfarists have claimed that genetic
engineering may enable us to design animal species that are fully adapted
to factory farming conditions (Rollin, 1995). Others, among them
veterinarians, are toying with possibilities of cloning and engineering
‘more suitable’ and ‘made-to-measure’ transgenic companion animals (Quain,
2002). For deep greens the issue of genetic engineering highlights
pressing dilemmas with regard to species integrity (Birke/Michael
How will the animal movement react? And will the deep ecology movement
tackle the issue at all? Admittedly, the deep green/deep ecology movement
concerns itself with species but only with species in the wild. Deep
greens may be worried about what will happen if transgenic populations
come into contact with naturally evolved wild ones. How will that affect
the community of species? Most genetic engineering is done to already
domesticated species, the ones the green movement isn’t interested in. But
recently there have been calls by green-leaning scientists to bring back
extinct wild species such as the Tasmanian tiger (thylacine) by way of
How we are to navigate between individualised ethics and ecosystemic
The animal lobby bestows on the sentient in nature a status of
individual humanness: it asks how animals are part of human society and
ethics. The movement could perhaps bridge the gap which separates it from
deep ecology by overcoming its exclusive focus on sentience. It could
extend its compassionate ethics so as to include the non-sentient and even
the inorganic. The tricky part would be how to include the whole earth
without simultaneously humanizing and colonizing it. Moreover there always
will be clashes of interest between animals and animals, animals and
plants, individuals and species, the organic and inorganic.
If compassionate society is about extending ethics as far as we can,
deep ecology is not. It is about compliance with and obedience to nature’s
measure, nature’s rhythm, nature’s limitations (Livingston 1994). It
concerns compliance with a nature that includes things like mortality,
predator-prey relationships, the ‘previousness’ of species, imperfect
bodies, our own finiteness. Instead of asking how animals are part of
ethics, deep ecology asks how animals and humans are part of nature.
Consider Val Plumwood’s musings about ‘Being Prey’. In 1985 this
vegetarian ecophilosopher barely survived a crocodile attack in Kakadu
National Park, in Australia’s Northern Territory. Thereby she came face to
face with her own edibility. It made her realize that not only had she a
body, like all animals she was a body: she was (potential) meat for
another animal to devour. The experience has forced her to rethink the
ethics/ecology dualism. It is good to focus on large predators such as
crocodiles, bears, sharks - those that can take a human life - Plumwood
states, because these animals present a test for us (also for the two
movements, I would add). Are we prepared to share and co-exist with the
free, wild, and mortally dangerous otherness of the earth, without
colonizing it into a form that eliminates all friction, challenge, or
consequence? Predator populations test our recognition of our human
existence in mutual, ecological terms, seeing ourselves as part of the
food chain: eaten as well as eater. (Plumwood 1999)
The two viewpoints – compliance with nature and societal ethics – at
times seem incompatible. It is a difficult dilemma. Mary Midgley (1983)
and Baird Callicott (in Hargrove 1992) tried to solve it by arguing that
wild animals deserve our protection as part of the ecosystem and that
domesticated animals are entitled to our care, because they are part of a
mixed human-animal community and we have ethical obligations to all the
individuals of such a community. The problem is: this arrangement would
not cover all animals. Feral animals and exotics belong neither to the
first group (the original ecosystem) nor to the second (the mixed domestic
community). The reason commonly given for persecuting and eradicating
these animals is precisely that they do not seem to belong to any
community. ‘Pests’ are neither interesting as species nor as individuals,
it is felt, and this turns them into outlaws.
Nevertheless all of us, animals as well as humans, somehow exist in
nature and also in society (or at least in a human-defined nation-state).
Each and everyone of us is a sentient individual, a species-member as well
as a ‘place’ in the world. In this world nature and society intersect. It
is all there is, nobody and nothing exists outside either.
The animal lobby needs to realize the importance of wildness, the
relative ‘otherness’ of non-humans, and what Livingston has called, the
“previousness” of species. It should guard against an ethical colonization
and humanization of nature. The deep ecology movement will need to pay
more heed to matters of sentience, cruelty and suffering in the way it
conceives of and treats individual animal beings, including those that
objectively do damage to other nature. Many feral species did not choose
to live where they are now living. Humanity took them there.
do justice to animal-human continuity we must ask ourselves what it is we
(should) do with nature but also how we ourselves are ‘of nature’.
According to Plumwood (1999) we cannot in a neo-Cartesian way divide the
world into two separate domains: an ethical, human realm and an animal,
ecological realm. Everyone and everything exists in both. All food is
souls, she says – and ultimately all souls are food.
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 Hunting would indeed be natural if human hunters would
kill their prey with their teeth or nails but they happen to use artefacts
such as high tech hunting or fishing equipment which makes hunting
‘cultural’ rather than natural.
 Incidentally, the two movements have so far not been
all that interested in each other’s literature. While working in a North
American faculty of environmental studies I found that my colleagues were
generally unfamiliar with animal ethics and animal rights literature other
than perhaps Peter Singer’s (whose work they had heard of, not read). A
journal such as Society & Animals is unknown among deep greens and
wildlife enthusiasts. On the other hand, many of the animal ethicists and
rightists I met on book tours and at conferences in the US, Canada,
Australia and New Zealand remain unfamiliar with literature of the deep
Animal Liberation Philosophy and Policy Journal, Volume 2, No. 1,
2004. -- Barbara Noske
I enjoyed Barbara Noske's 2004 paper you've posted on ALF.com. Just
to let you know, I've written an update about the issues raised in her
article. My vegan background existed while working for NGOs in both
environmental and animal welfare/rights sectors. It is titled, This Is
Hope: Green Vegans and the New Human Ecology / How we find our way to a
humane and environmentally sane future (Earthbooks / 2013). You can get
some sense of my approach at
This Is Hope: Green Vegans and the New Human Ecology
How we find our way to a humane and environmentally sane future