Xenografts and Animal Rights
by Gary L. Francione
["Transplantation Proceedings", Vol. 22, No.
3, 1990, p1044-1046.]
Contents:
There are many ethical issues raised by
xenografts (cross-species transplantations). In this article I will
briefly discuss just one of these ethical issues: the moral status of the
use of nonhuman animals involved in xenografts. In at least one sense, the
fact that the animal use occurs in the context of a xenograft is
irrelevant. That is, if one accepts that human animals may always (or
almost always) use nonhumans to serve human purposes, then it should make
no significant difference whether the use is for the purpose of a
xenograft, or some other purpose, such as drug testing or food
consumption. Conversely, if one rejects any (or almost any) exploitation
of nonhuman animals, then the purpose of the exploitation will probably
not matter.
In another sense, however, xenografts crystallize the basic moral issue
in a rather dramatic way. To the extent that a xenograft is successful, or
will be successful in at least some cases, one can arguably trace a direct
benefit that results from the exploitation of the nonhuman animal. This
ostensibly tangible benefit distinguishes the xenograft from at least some
other instances of vivisection where any benefit is likely to be far more
attenuated. Whenever there is an arguably "direct" benefit from
vivisection, the character of the debate seems to change, and even some
people who would normally oppose animal exploitation will "balance" in
favor of what is perceived to be the human interest. It would seem, then,
that there would be strong moral arguments in favor of at least some
xenografts if the ostensible benefit to humans is weighed only against the
harm to animals.
It is clear that the efforts to perfect xenografts will intensify. But
it is also clear that these efforts will meet with more resistance from
what is referred to loosely as the "animal rights" community. There are at
least three reasons why this resistance will intensify. First, more and
more people are rejecting the "balancing" approach as an appropriate way
to resolve moral issues. Second, the concept of animal rights is
becoming increasingly accepted as the morally appropriate alternative to
the balancing approach. Third, as a general matter, various groups,
including but not limited to the animal rights movement, have begun to
question the "objectivity" of science, and see science as a political
activity. The remainder of this article will present a (brief) exploration
of these three factors.
Although some early
thinkers did ascribe rights to nonhumans, the animal "rights" movement
was, until recently, really an animal "welfare" movement. That is, most
people, including those very actively involved in trying to ameliorate
conditions for animals, accepted that animals could be exploited by humans
in various ways, but that humans had an obligation to ensure that animals
were not used in trivial ways and that they were treated as well as
possible given the particular type of use involved. It was our
responsibility to balance human interests and animal interests.
This welfare approach is reflected in virtually all current and
proposed legislation concerning animals. For example, consider the changes
to the Canadian Criminal Code recently proposed by the Law Reform
Commission of Canada. The proposed law criminalizes any
unnecessary
injury or pain inflicted on an animal, and, in the case of research,
defines "unnecessary" pain or injury as that "disproportionate to the
benefit expected from such research." Whether experimentation meets the
proportionality test will, for all purposes, be determined by the research
community which, in all but the most extreme cases, will defer to the
individual vivisector. In essence, the proportionality test merely
restates, and does not explain, the necessity requirement. Far from
representing a progressive approach, the proposed law merely codifies a
standard that most people--even those who use animals in
experiments--would accept as tautologically true--that animals ought not
be subjected to unnecessary pain or injury. The proposed law strikes the
balance dramatically in favor of human interests and accepts that animals
may be used in experiments, as long as there is some benefit expected from
the use.
The problem with this type of approach is apparent: As long as those
who do the balancing regard virtually any "benefit" to justify animal use,
there will be no effective regulation of animal research. Although every
person would agree that animals ought not to be used for "trivial"
purposes, there are myriad instances of animal use that must be regarded
as morally unjustifiable whatever understanding of "trivial" is employed.
Nevertheless, the experimenters who performed those experiments would
hardly characterize their work as "trivial" and, in most cases, neither
did the people who performed the peer review for those experiments.
People do the balancing and until recently,
most people have accepted that species is a morally relevant
criterion to determine membership in the moral community. That is, animal
interests have been underestimated systematically in this balancing
process because of species discrimination, which is no different from
discrimination based on race or sex. This species discrimination, or
speciesism, as it is commonly referred to, has resulted in the
justification of barbaric cruelty to animals.
But even if we were to be more conscientious about our balancing
approach, this method of approaching moral issues would still be
inadequate. The reason for this inadequacy is that balancing alone
virtually never provides a satisfactory answer. For example, assume that
virtually all xenografts would point to the ostensible consequences of
improved human health to justify the practice. Those who disfavor
xenografts would point to the negative consequences to the nonhuman
animals. Although both sides accepted a balancing framework, there would
be no agreement on the ultimate issue because an appeal to consequences
can never work unless there is some sort of agreement on the valuation of
those consequences.
Despite our resort to the balancing
approach to resolve issues about the exploitation of animals, many of us
do not use this same approach to resolve other moral issues. For example,
very few people are willing to balance interests where the issue is using
unwilling humans as donors of organs or as experimental subjects.
This reluctance has to do with the fact that we are unwilling to
balance where fundamental rights are involved. That is, most of us believe
that human beings possess certain rights. Sometimes the character or
extent of these rights will be determined by a balancing process. For
example, I may live in a society that grants me a right to medical care,
but the scope of that right may be determined by balancing my right
against other uses of resources. But there are some rights where such a
balancing would not be permitted. For example, I suspect that few would
accept as morally justifiable the enslavement of other human beings even
if it could be demonstrated that marvelous consequences would ensue for
all free people. A right acts as a sort of barrier between the rightholder
and everyone else. If I have a right to be free, then, as a general
matter, the fact that it will benefit you if I am enslaved is irrelevant.
Until recently, the dispute between those who use animals and those
opposed to such use has centered on different concepts of "necessity"--one
group would balance in a manner different from another group but both
would balance and accept the legitimacy of a balancing approach. Indeed,
even the position articulated by Peter Singer must be characterized as a
balancing approach. Singer argued that species is not a morally relevant
criterion for determining membership in the moral community and that
equivalent human and animal interest ought to be accorded the same weight
in the balancing process. Although Singer's approach would rule out a
great deal of animal exploitation, it does not represent a rights approach
(for people or animals).
The theoretical playing field changed dramatically in 1983 with the
publication of Tom Regan's theory of animal rights. Regan argued
persuasively that some animals have at least some of the same rights that
humans have, and Regan explicitly rejects all forms of balancing. Although
Regan's arguments are complex, and deserve to be read in their entirety,
the thrust of his approach may be characterized as a recognition that
animals have some of the same characteristics that lead us to grant rights
to humans. In failing to extend the relevant rights to nonhumans, Regan
argues, we are merely engaging in species discrimination. Regan's work is
now beginning to have a dramatic impact on popular thought, and the
concept of animal rights--as opposed to animal welfare--is beginning to
take hold.
It is clear that once we accept the concept of animal rights, it no
longer is open to us to ask whether the "sacrifice" of a baboon to help
Baby Fae is morally justifiable. The baboon is not something that exists
for the benefit of Baby Fae any more than Baby Fae exists for the benefit
of the baboon. The balancing question becomes irrelevant.
The third reason
for the increased opposition to xenografts (and other forms of
vivisection) is that science no longer enjoys a position as
epistemologically superior to other forms of knowledge. Despite the
seductive simplicity of the traditional empiricist point of view--that
science represents "objective" truth, the assumptions supporting this
traditional view have been challenged effectively in recent years.
Philosophers and sociologists of science have argued persuasively that
factual assertions are completely contingent on theoretical assumptions,
and that observation itself is subject to interpretation. In addition, the
problems that scientists choose to solve are often dictated by political
concerns.
This recognition is slowly eroding the pedestal upon which science has
presided for many years. More and more people in the animal rights
movement, the environmental movement, and the alternative health care
movement recognize that science is as value-based as any other activity.
Indeed, there is increasing criticism of the fundamental premises of
Western medicine.
It is clear that the exploitation of animals in science, whether for
xenografts or other purposes, raises ethical issues in addition to any
technical issues. Scientists are no better able to cope with the vital
ethical issues than are the rest of us.
Once we accept that animals have
rights, the framework of our discussion of the morality of xenografts must
change. That is not to say that a balancing approach would sanction
xenografts. On the contrary, the current level of medical technology and
resource allocation is such that a very good argument could be made that
at least some xenografts are morally unjustifiable for many reasons. But
what if we could be substantially certain that a particular xenograft will
work? We would then be faced with a much more difficult decision under a
balancing approach. Indeed, under such a set of circumstances, the
benefits to be gained would be unlike the supposed benefits that occur in
the context of basic research. That is, the prospect of a successful
xenograft raises very difficult questions for the consequential moral
theorist who balances interests.
But if instead we accept a rights approach (i.e., that a baboon is an
individual with a right to exist not contingent on his/her providing a
benefit to humans) then it is far less difficult to see why the xenograft
is morally unjustifiable. Consequences are irrelevant where fundamental
rights are involved. |
