Does Veganism Make a Difference?

One common charge against veganism is that abjuring the consumption of factory-farmed animal products will not actually have a real-world impact. Indeed, this is the argument of last resort for those who come to accept the utilitarian position on factory farming yet refuse to change their diets accordingly. In this essay, I endeavor to refute this weak excuse.

Let us first examine the logic behind the position that abstention from factory-farmed products is not morally implied by concern for animals. Everyone in the debate agrees that, at some point, a substantial decrease in demand for meat--for instance, conversion to veganism by half of the US population---would diminish the quantity supplied of factory-farmed animals. "That's great," argues the opponent of veganism, "but it has nothing to do with individual purchasing habits. The only decisions that will actually affect the amount of animal suffering are massive investment choices: whether to build a new factory farm or whether to put an addition on a colossal chicken house. One consumer cannot even change the bulk purchases that each individual grocery store or dining center makes, much less the collective demand that all of these retailers exert. So I can continue to eat meat, eggs, and milk without creating demand for the production of any more animals. A certain amount of meat will be produced whether I am a vegan or not, so why shouldn't I at least subsist off those excess scraps, instead of letting them go to waste?"

Suppose that a supermarket currently purchases three cases per week of factory-farm milk. The store does not purchase fractions of cases, so even if several cartons of surplus milk remain on the shelves each week, the supermarket will continue to buy three cases. This is what the anti-vegan means by subsisting off of surplus animal products that would otherwise go to waste: the three cases are purchased anyway, so consuming one or two more cartons simply attenuates the surplus.

What would happen, though, if 200 customers decided to buy soy milk instead of cow's milk? The purchasing agent who orders weekly cases of milk would probably buy two cases instead of three. At some point between a lowered demand of 0 cartons and 200 cartons, the purchasing agent made the decision to order one less case; however, it's impossible to determine exactly where the dividing line will be. The agent's decision may be arbitrarily based on approximately how many cartons of milk the store appears to have at the moment, and it is impossible to know ahead of time whether that arbitrary judgment will be made between the 36th and 37th cartons that are not demanded, or between the 182nd and 183rd cartons. But somewhere, that dividing line exists. (I do not know exactly how ordering decisions are made at supermarkets and retail stores; perhaps they are based on historical data of consumption levels at various times of the year. But regardless of the detailed procedure, the point is that they are based in some way on the actual amount of products purchased.)

Not only does any given consumer not know the number of the carton that will determine how many cases the supermarket buys; she also does not know the number of the carton that she is purchasing, because she has no way of knowing how many other consumers like her happen--for whatever reason--to be demanding fewer cartons as well. So even if she could establish that the supermarket would not buy one fewer case of milk until consumers bought four hundred fewer cartons, she would have no way of knowing whether the individual carton that she refrains from purchasing is that four hundredth carton or--what is more likely---whether her refusal to buy an earlier carton will cause someone else to be the four hundredth person not to buy a carton.

The same logic applies in reverse to the anti-vegan's "subsistence from surplus" excuse. The opponent of veganism claims that the supermarket would buy three cases of milk per week anyway, regardless of whether he himself buys one carton and lowers the store's surplus waste from 18 to 17 cartons. But at some point--at some minimum level of surplus or deficit--the store's purchasing agent will choose to buy four cases instead of three. As before, any individual consumer has no way of knowing at which number carton that change will occur or which number carton he happens to be buying.

Assume it takes 200 fewer consumers of milk in order for the supermarket to buy one less carton. Inasmuch as individual consumers have no way of telling whether their particular carton will be the one that changes the number of cases purchased, the probability of any given carton being the determining factor is 1/200. The expected value of an action is the probability that a benefit will result times the magnitude of the benefit if it does result, so the expected value of refraining from the purchase of any given carton of milk is (1/200)(1 fewer case purchased)(200 cartons/case) = 1 fewer carton purchased. The exact expected values will of course fluctuate on account of the randomness of the purchasing agent's decisions (if, for instance, she would not buy one fewer case until 300 fewer consumers demanded milk, even though each case includes only 200 cartons), but they should average out over the long run in such a way that forbearing the purchase of any given amount of an animal product will be expected to reduce bulk purchase of that amount of the product.

This logic applies also to the rest of the factory-farmed-meat demand process: at some critical mass of fewer cartons ordered by stores, distributors will purchase less milk from farms, and that reduced demand from farms will, at some point, constrict production. By the end, the probability that any given consumer will impact animal production is miniscule, but the benefits if he does are immense. Thus, the expected value of refraining from the purchase of any given amount of an animal product (e.g., a chicken wing) is roughly equivalent to preventing the production of the portion of an animal that the product represents (the fraction of a chicken that a wing constitutes). Of course, it is entirely possible (perhaps even likely) that a vegan may go through her entire life and never, by failing to purchase factory-farmed-animal products, have actually prevented any animal suffering by lowering production. But because she has no way of knowing when the special purchase that does set off the chain of significant demand reduction will be, she has to act as if every purchase does count. (For more on this idea, see my "Instrumental Judgment and Expectational Consequentialism.") And for all she knows, she may just as easily be a consumer who has more than her share of impact on demand for factory-farmed products.

While the above mechanism for the impact of veganism may apply to most cases, there are some situations in which the demand-reduction benefits of abstaining from animal products are less likely to materialize. The most notable example might be a party or picnic to which--despite one's best efforts--people have brought hot dogs and hamburgers. The purchasing decisions of a supermarket may be imprecise and sometimes arbitrary, but they will eventually be affected if demand changes by a great enough amount. The same can not be said of those who purchase items for a picnic. In general, the purchaser will buy some overestimated amount of food beforehand, regardless of how many people actually consume those comestibles at the event. And whereas a store that purchases far too much of a product will keep records and change its behavior the next time, people buying picnic food probably will not. So it is quite unlikely that one's decision to eat or refrain from eating a factory-farmed-animal product at an informal social gathering will make a difference in the amount of food that the organizer purchases the next time. (Perhaps the best way to limit the harm done by a picnic is to ask the purchaser ahead of time to buy less meat.)

But even if consuming a hamburger at a picnic would assuredly not change the direct amount of meat purchased, there might still be other good reasons for refraining from the consumption of animal products. First, people may not realize the extensive reasoning presented above and thence may view a vegan's consumption of the hamburger as contradictory (even if it actually is not). This misunderstanding might diminish the respect that others have for the vegan in particular and for the cause of veganism in general. (Perhaps the vegan would unintentionally be showing how hard it is to maintain his diet, thereby discouraging others from trying.) Second, avoiding animal products can raise the topic of factory farming. This, indeed, is one of the most important consequences of being a vegan in any context, for good discussions--combined with the literature exchange or further research that might follow--have the potential to permanently change other people's eating habits.

Note: This article is very similar to another I've since discovered: "Expected Utility, Contributory Causation, and Vegetarianism" by Gaverick Matheny.